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ABSTRACT
This papers analyzes dispersion in the prices that an
airline cIarges to different customers on the same route. Such
variation in airlines fares is substantial: the expected absolute
difference in fares between two of an airline's passengers on a
route averages thirty-six percent of the airline's average ticket
price on the route.
The pattern of price dispersion that we find does not seem
to be explained solely by cost differences. Dispersion is higher
on more competitive routes, possibly reflecting a pattern of
discrimination against customers who are less willing to switch
to alternative flights or airlines. We argue that the data
support an explanation based on theories of price discrimination
in nionopolistically competitive industries.
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Explaining price differences among related products andamong
buyers of the same product is a popular pasttime for economists. Is a
restaurant's markup on wine higher than on food because wine purchase
signals a low demand elasticity for the whole meal or because it indicates
a customer who is more costly to serve? Are grocery prices higher in poor
neighborhoods than in wealthy ones because the cost of doing business is
higher in poor areas or because buyers there are less mobile and less able
to switch stores? Until recently, explanations that implied price discrirni-
nation often were discounted in markets with easy entry and firms earning
normal retu!ns in the long run. That response, however, has become less
compelling with the presentation of numerous theoretical models in which
price discrimination persists in the markets with multiple firms and even
where firms earn zero economic profits)-
This paper analyzes price dispersion in the U.S. airline industry in
the context of the recent theoretical advances on competitive price discrimi-
nation. We focus on two objectives. First, we wish to quantify the extent of
fare inequality in the airline industry and to describe patterns of price dis-
persion across markets.2 Second, we attempt to distinguish price dispersion
due to discriminatory pricing from dispersion that results from variations
in costs.3 To meet this objective, we examine the degree to which dis-
See Katz, 1984, Borenstein, 1985,andHolmes, 1989. For thorough treatments
of price discrimination in monopoly and competitive markets, see Tirole, 1988,
and Varian, 1989. While there has been little empirical work on price discrimi-
nation —seePratt, Wise and Zeckhauser, 1979, and Dahlby and West, 1986, for
example— recent analyses have begun to account for the effects of competition
on the type and degree of discrimination. See Borenstein, 1989b, and Shepard,
forthcoming.
2Throughoutthis study, we use the term "price dispersion" to refer to the vari-
ation in prices charged to different passengers on the same airline and. route.
Following Stigler, 1987, and Varian, 1989, we think of discriminatory prices as
1persion is affected by population, product, and market characteristics that
should influence the amount of variation due to price discrimination, while
attempting to control for the dispersion due to costs. We are especially in-
terested in measuring the effects of market structure and the firm's relative
market position on observed price variation.
We find considerable dispersion in airline prices. The expected dif-
ference in prices paid for two passengers selected at random on a route is
more than 35 percent of the mean ticket price on the route. We find that
dispersion is higher on more competitive routes and that increased mar-
ket density and high concentrations of tourist traffic are associated with
lower levels of price dispersion, consistent with models of competitive price
discrimination (Borenstein, 1985, and Holmes, 1989). We also find that
variations in airport congestion levels are associated with increased disper-
sion, as would be expected from peak-load pricing.
While we interpret the evidence as suggestive of price discrimina-
tion, it is important to recognize that our analysis is descriptive rather than
normative. As we know from theoretical research, price discriminationmay
increase or decrease social welfare. Airline cost functions alsâmay imply
that some degree of price discrimination (in the form of Ramsey prices, for
example) is necessary to enable carriers to break even.
We describe our measure of price dispersion in U.S. airline mar-
kets and the variations in dispersion across carriers and markets in section
II. Section III discusses possible sources of price dispersion, including both
discrimination-based and cost-based explanations. The empirical model
differing in markups of price over cost, while cost-based differences, such as
peak-load pricing, hold markups constant.
Some of these findings could also be consistent with specific models of peak-load
pricing. We discuss this at length below.
2and methodology are described in section IV. Results arepresented in sec-
tion V and their implications are explored in the concluding section.
II. Summary Measures of Airline Price Dispersion
Little is known about the extent of actual price dispersion in the
U.S. airline industry, despite evidence of substantial variation inpublished
fares, as well as widespread recognition of the critical role of "yieldmanage-
ment."5 To determine the magnitude of price dispersion and to describeits
distribution across markets, we first develop measures of pricedispersion
based on actual prices paid for air travel.
The data set we use, based on the Department of Transportation's
database DB1A, records the prices paid for a 10 percent randomsample of
all airline tickets used in the U.S. during the second quarter of 1986. Our
analysis focuses on direct coach class travel in the largest direct service U.S.
domestic air markets.6 Change-of-plane and first class travel are excluded
because they entail significantly different qualities of service than direct
coach travel and controlling for their associated cost differences would be
very difficult.
We restrict the sample to routes in the top 1200 airline markets on
which more than 80% of passengers traveled direct. For these markets, we
calculate price dispersion measures for each of the 11 major U.S. domestic
"Yield management" refers to the industry's dynamic allocation of discount
seats so as to maximize revenue on each flight. See Belobaba, 1989, for an
extensive discussion of this practice.
6 Direct service means thata passenger does not change planes, i.e.,iterdudes
connecting service. The data do not allow us to distinguish between nonstop
service and other direct service, i.e., travel with on-plane stops. The chief
disadvantages of the database are that it records neither the date of purchase
nor the flight on which the ticket is used, nor any advanced-purchase, minimum-
stay or other restrictions associated with the fare paid —limitationsdiscussed
in the following sections.
3carriers at the time: American, Continental, Delta,Eastern, Northwest,
Piedmont, Republic, TWA, United, Western, and USAir.7 The selection
criteria leave us with a data set of 1021 carrier-route observationson 521
routes. The largest route in the sample is Boston -LaGuardia(New York),
with 58,607 direct servicepassengers during the quarter. The smallest route
is Seattle -Ketchikan(Alaska), with 235 direct service passengers during
the quarter. The data appendix details the construction of the dataset.
Measuring Price Dispersion
We measure price dispersion, or inequality, with a Gini coefficient
(GINI) of fares paid.8 The Gini coefficient is twice the area between
the 45 degree line (the line of absolute equality inprices) and the Lorenz
curve, where the Lorenz curve is defined as the proportion of total revenues
contributed by the bottom x proportion of customers,x(0, 1.00), and
We include price observations only for carriers reporting fare information for
more than 50 direct passengers on the route during the quarter. Prices are
measured as one-way fares; these are computed as one-half the reported fare
for round- trip tickets.
8Theresults of our study are very similar when we instead measure dispersion
by the coefficient of variation (CV), defined as the stan4ard deviation of fares
divided by the mean fare. This is not surprising, because the twomeasures
have a correlation of 0.94 in our sample. Other empirical studies of price dis-
persion have used the variance or standard deviation of prices (Pratt, Wise
and Zeckhauser, 1979; Dahlby and West, 1986) or the ratio of highest to lowest
prices (Pratt, Wise and Zeckhauser, 1979; and Schwieterman, 1985). Unscaled
variances or standard deviations, however, are likely to be functions not only
of differences in dispersion aaoss markets, but also of differences inmean price
levels. We also have analyzed the degree of price dispersion using a measure
of the relative interquintile range (IQRANGE), where IQRANGE =(80th percentile price -20thpercentile price)/xnedian price, and have found similar
results. IQRANCE is in the spirit of a minimum-to-maximum price difference
measure that has been used in some previous work, but it has two advantages
over measures based on more extreme prices: (1) if few passengers pay the
absolute minimum or maximum prices extreme price differencesmay look de-
ceptively large for some markets, and (2) extreme price measures are likely to
be much more sensitive to recording errors in price data. IQRANGE shares
a significant drawback of other dispersion measures based on the price range,
however, in that it does not reflect differences in the distribution of prices be-
tween the measured endpoint prices. Because of this, we focus on the Gini
coeffident.
4Table 1
Price Dispersion in Direct Airline Markets
1021 Observations
Mean Price Disners ion Measures
SummaryMeasures than Standard Deviation
Cmi .181 .063
CV .362 .117
Mean Fare $104.81 $41.06
Distributionof Price Dispersion Measures
;bservption Qini Mean PareCarrier Route
Yfinimua Cmi .018 $65.10 Eastern Boston-LaGuardia
10th Percentile Cmi.103 75.10 Delta DEW-New Orleans
25thPercentile Cmi .131 192.10 United LAX-Kona1 Hawaii
50th Percentile Cmi .178 153.10 Delta Atlanta-Tampa
/5th Percentile Cmi .224 45.00 Piedmont Charlotte-Charleston
90th Percentile Cmi .258 190.30 American Chicago-Hartford
(aximuaCmi .416 91.60 IVA Phoenix-Las Vegaspassengers ranked by fares paid. Multiplying the Gird coefficient by two
gives the expected absolute difference in prices as a proportion of the mean
price for two customers drawn at random from a population.9 A Gini
coefficient of .10thereforeimplies an expected absolute price difference of
20 percent of the mean fare.
Stylized Facts about Airline Price Dispersion
The data reveal substantial dispersion in the prices that an airline
charges different customers in the same market. The average Gini coefficient
for our sample is .181 (standard deviation, .063), which corresponds to an
expected absolute fare difference of 36 percent of the mean fare for two
passengers selected at random on a given carrier and route. In fact, average
fare differences across carriers on a route are small relative to differences
in prices among customers of each airline: on the 336 routes in our sample
served by more than one major carrier, the ratio of within-carrier price
variation to total (within and between) variation averages 97 percent.10
There also is considerable variation in price dispersion across dif-
ferent carrier-routes. Table 1 provides information on the distribution of
price dispersion across markets by reporting selected observations ranked
in order of their Gini coefficients. The Gini coefficient in our sampleranges
from .018 (an expected price difference of 3.6 percent of mean fare) on East-
ern's Boston-LaGuardia Shuttle route to .416 (an expected price difference
of 83.2 percent) on TWA's Phoenix-Las Vegas route. In the market with
We are grateful to Lawrence Smniners for pointing out this interpretation to
us. The expectation is independent of distributional assumptions, but holds
only asymptotically; the expected difference as a fraction of the mean price is
2.04 times the Gini with a sample of 50 and 2.02 with a sample of 100.
10Theconclusion is not very sensitive to the exclusion of small carriers from mu
data set. This ratio avenges 94 percent for the 425 non-monopoly routes when
all carriers, not just the 11 major carriers, are included in the calculation.
5the 10th percentile Gini, the bottom half of the passengers contribute 37
percent of total revenues, while in the market with the 90th percentile Gini,
the bottom half of passengers contribute only 27 percent of total revenues
—andthis contribution drops to 20 percent in the maximum Gini market.
The Lorenz curves associated with the minimum, 10th, 50th, 90th, and
maximum percentile Gini observations are illustrated in figure 1.
Before attempting to model the determinants of this range of dis-
persion across carrier-routes, we characterize some of the patterns of disper-
sion that appear in the data. First, price dispersion is inversely correlated
with concentration on the route. The correlation between the Gini coeffi-
cient and the passenger Herfindahl index on the route is —0.153." This
result may be consistent with both models of price discrimination under
imperfect competition and certain forms of peak-load pricing behavior in
airline markets. We explore these explanations in the following sections.
Second, the dispersion of fares for a carrier-route is larger when the
average fare is itself large; the correlation coefficient between GINI and
average fare is 0.354. This may suggest that airlines with more sophisticated
yield management techniques are able to raise average fares through more
precise marekt segmentation. Yield management is also often credited with
allowing airlines to fill more seats on each flight without sacrificing revenues,
an assertion that is supported by a positive correlation of 0.130 between
GINI and the carrier's average load factor on its nonstop flights on the
route.
Finally, for routes on which two or more major carriers compete,
" If these two variables are assumed to be distributed bivariate nonnal, this cor-
relation is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. Under the bivariate
normal assumption all of the correlations discussed in the remainder of this
section are significant at the 1% level.













Percent of Passengershigher within-carrier price dispersion is associated with higher between-
carrier dispersion of mean fares, with a correlation of .361 between the
two coefficients of variation. This also may reflect differences in the effec-
tiveness of yield management across carriers. When fare spreads are high,
small differences in carriers' yield management abilities may translate into
significant differences in average fares.
IlL Sources of Airline Price Dispersion
The dispersion we observe in airline prices may arise both from
variations in the costs of serving different passengers and from discriini-
natory pricing, i.e., variations in the mark-up of price over marginal cost.
Disentangling these sources of price dispersion is difficult because prod-
uct heterogeneities that may affect the airline's costs —forexample, the
time and day of the week that travel occurs, ticketing restrictions, and the
number of stops or plane changes that a passenger must make —alsomay
provide a basis for self-selective price discrimination. Indeed, self-selective
discrimination relies upon product heterogeneity, since it is carried out by
offering consumers a set of alternatives and allowing their choices to reveal
information about their characteristics.'2 Many restrictions associated with
discount tickets seem intended to foster self-selection, separating business
passengers from discretionary passengers (e.g., those traveling on vacation
or to visit friends or relatives).
Ideally, one would distinguish cost-based dispersion from price dis-
crimination by calculating marginal cost and the markup over marginal
cost. Unfortunately, data limitations combined with the nature of airline
12Thisis in contrast to what Spence, 1973, calls index sorting, in which consumers
are classified by the seller and have no ability to change classes.
7cost functions preclude direct calculation of marginal cost for each ticket.'3
1iVe therefore study the relationship between price dispersion and factors
that might indicate a basis either for cost variations or price discrimination.
This approach permits us to distinguishamong competing explanations of
price dispersion if we can identify variables that affect price dispersion only
through cost variation or only through price discrimination but not both,
or if the expected signs of the variables differ depending on whether cost
differences or discrimination drive the price variation. We describe below
both discriminatory and cost-based sources of price dispersion and sketch
the factors that may contribute to each.
Price Discrimination
Price discrimination conventionally has been studied in the context
of monopoly markets. In those markets, discrimination is limited only by
the diversity of the demand elasticities in the customer population and by
the firm's ability to segment demand. At the opposite extreme of market
structure —perfectcompetition —pricediscrimination cannot be sustained.
Traditionally, these polar cases have been used as a guide to the likely
outcomes from market structures that lie between the two extrethes. Under
this view, the degree of observed price dispersion would be expected to
decrease as a market became less concentrated.
Recent theoretical works by Borenstein (1985) and Holmes (1989)
indicate, however, that price discrimination may increase as a market moves
from monopolistic to imperfectly competitive. Under monopoly, the firm's
profit-maximizing price for each customer group will depend on the group's
elasticity of demand for the product. When there are competitors in the
13Marginalcost is particularly difficult to quantify given fixed capacity in the
short-run and a shadow capacity cost for eadi flight that varies over time.
8market, a firm's price may depend on both a group's elasticity of demand
for the product, which we will refer to as the group's "industry elasticity"
of demand, and its "cross-elasticity" of demand among brands or firms.14
The expected effect of competition on price discrimination is ambiguous in
these models.
For example, consider a market in which all buyers have identical
industry elasticities (or reservation prices) for the product, but some have
strong preference among brands of the product while others have much
higher cross-elasticities across brands. The profit-maximizing monopoly
prices would depend only on a buyer's industry elasticity, because the mo-
nopolist would control all brands (or outlets) of the product, and thus would
be indifferent as to which brand of the product a person bought. If industry
elasticities are identical, the monopolist will charge a single price.15 If the
differentiated brands were owned by competing firms, however, the demand
elasticity faced by each firm would depend both on the industry elasticity
of the buyers and on their cross-elasticities among brands. Even if all buy-
ers have identical industry elasticities, differences in cross-elasticities could
induce the firms to charge different consumers different prices.
In the more competitive case, in which every buyer gets positive
net consumer surplus from at least two brands (owned by different firms),
14 This tenninology is from }lolines. Analogously, Borenstein presents a spatial
model of competition in which consumers differ in their reservation prices for
the product and in their cost (per unit distance) of buying brands that are away
from their preferred points in characteristic space. Both models consider only
fInns that sell one brand each. If we think of brands as flights located around
a clock, then this is not an accurate description of an airline's service inmost
markets. The theory of price discrimination under multi-product monopolistic
competition unlortunately has not, to our knowledge, been fonnalized.
15 Tn the case of perfect first-degree price discrimination, the finn would want
each buyer to choose the brand that maximizes her surplus and would then
want to extract all of that surplus with a price equal to her reservation price
for the product, which is the same for buyers in this example.
9industry elasticities become irrelevant to each firm's optimal prices, because
each potential customer's best alternative to buying one brand is to buy a
competing brand. In this case, competitive firms could discriminate only
on cross-elasticities. If all buyers had identical cross-elasticities, but dif-
fered in their industry elasticities (or reservation prices), then competitive
firms would be unable to price discriminate, while a monopolist controlling
all brands of a product would be able to use the differences in industry
elasticities to price discriminate.
To develop an intuition for how price discriminationmay increase
with competition, consider an airline market in which the single incumbent
charges "full fare" to business travellers (who are likely to have low industry
and cross- elasticities) and a discount fare to discretionary travellers(who
are likely to have higher industry and cross- elasticities). If entry induces
the incumbent to lower both prices, but to lower the discount price by
relatively more, then price dispersion will increase as concentration declines
in the market. This pattern appears quite common in airline markets.
Borenstejn (1939a) finds that more competitive routes have loweraverage
fares, other things equal, and that lower end fares are even more responsive
to competition than are higher end fares.
We will refer to the case in which price discrimination is based
primarily on industry elasticities as "monopoly price discrimination," and
the case in which discrimination is based primarily on cross-elasticitiesas
"competitive price discrimination." Whether sorting of customers is related
primarily to their industry elasticities or primarily to their cross- elastici-
ties, the factors that determine the amount of price dispersion that results
from the discrimination tend to fall into three categories: marketstructure,
consumer population attributes, and product charatacteristics.
10Market Structure: Market structure could exert a strong effect on the level
of price discrimination, although the direction of the effect on price dis-
persion will depend upon whether monopoly or competitive price discrim-
ination dominates. Cross-elasticities of demand become a relatively more
important determinant of price discrimination and industry elasticities be-
come relatively less important as a higher proportion of a firm's marginal
customers are deciding which of the available firms to buy from rather
than deciding whether or not to buy the product at all. This will occur if,
holding constant the number of flights on a route, those "brands" (flights)
are operated by a large number of firms. Assuming that industry- and
cross-elasticities of demand are positively correlated in the population, dis-
crimination is likely to increase with concentration if industry elasticities
are the more prevalent basis for segmentation (monopoly discrimination),
and to decrease with concentration if heterogeneities in cross-elasticity are
the more common source of discrimination (competitive discrimination).
To measure market concentration, we construct FLTHERF, a Herfindahi
Index based on the share of total flights performed by each airline on the
route, defined over the range 0, 1.16
PopulationAttributes: Price discrimination is likely to increase with the
variance of attributes in the population that reflect buyers' industry elas—
ticities or cross-elasticities among brands.17 In most air travel markets,
16Potentialendogeneity of right-hand side variables is discussed in the next sec-
tion. For FLTHERF as well as FLTTOT and FLTSHARE, described be-
low, we also constructed analogous variables using passenger totals and shares,
even though the theoxy suggests that flight-based variables are more appropri-
ate measures, at least for the market density and share variables. The results
using passenger-based variables are broadly consistent with those presented but
the estimates are much less precise.
17Anexception to this can occur if the dispersion of some characteristic within
the population implies a higher price for a group that would pay a lower price
in the absence of that dispersion, or vice versa.
11these consumer characteristics are likely to be strongly positively cone-
lated. Business travelers seem to have lower industry demand elasticities
and to have higher time valuations, making them less willing to switch
flights to get a lower fare and implying a lower cross-elasticity of demand
across firms or flights. Discretionary or "tourist" travelers are more likely
to have high industry demand elasticities and to view competing flights or
firms as close substitutes, implying high cross-elasticities. This suggests
that under both monopoly and competitive price discrimination, price dis-
persion will be lower in markets where either business or tourist customers
dominate the population than in markets where both types of passengers
are prevalent.
Our control for variations in customer distribution is a somewhat
crude measure of the tourist/business mix on a route. This variable, TO UR-
1ST, is based on a tourism index for each endpoint city weighted by the
share of the carrier's traffic originating at the other endpoint city. TO UR-
1ST does well in identifying high tourism markets, but is not very powerful
in distinguishing among markets with low or moderate amounts of tourist
traffic.'8 We therefore expect price dispersion to decrease as TOURIST
rises even though a more precise measure of the tourist/business mix might
show a quadratic effect.
The size of the consumer population and the resulting demand for
air travel on a route is likely to affect the degree of price discrimination
in a market. Greater population density is likely to generate greater equi-
Our tourism index is quite skewed, with only 10% of the observations failing
more than one standard deviation above the mean. A few high tourism cities
(such as Las Vegas and Reno and some of the Florida cities) account for a sub-
stantial share of the variation in TOURIST. Preliminary work with nonlinear
functions of TOURIST suggested a limited ability of the data to pick up any
but the high tourist market effects.
12librium product variety, as measured by flight frequency, which may affect
both monopoly and competitive price discrimination, although in opposite
ways. More frequent service increases the convenience of traveling on the
route and thus raises consumers' reservation prices generally (lowering in-
dustry elasticities). The increased value of the product probably is greater
for business travelers, who tend to place a higher value on their time. Un-
der monopoly price discrimination, improvements in service would imply
increased price dispersion.
A high density of flights on a route also decreases the time between
competing flights, thereby increasing the substitutability across flights. If
these flights are offered by competing firms, the cross-elasticity across firms
will tend to increase. This may lessen firms' abilities to discriminate on the
basis of differences among consumers in their costs of switching flights. If
heterogeneity in cross-elasticities is the basis for segmentation of demand —
i.e.,competitive price discrimination —pricedispersion is likely to decline
as density increases.19
The effect of density highlights a possible asymmetry in price dis-
persion across firms that may depend on firms' relative positions in the
market. If a carrier has a large share of the flights on a route, it may
be less likely to respond to differences in cross-elasticities when setting its
prices. For example, if an airline offers 10 of the 11 daily flights on a route,
then a customer's willingness to switch from his most preferred departure
time may have little effect on the carrier's pricing strategy, since the cus-
tomer's second most preferred flight is likely to be with the same airline.
The airline that offers only 1 of the 11 daily flights would be quite concerned
19Inthe context of a spatial model of competition where each firm has only
one outlet, this is analogous to a decrease in the "size" of the market holding
constant the number of finns.
13with distinguishing which of its potentialpassengers can most easily switch
flights, however. In a sense, this is a continuity result from the position of
a monopolist, who receives the business of a customer regardless of which
flight is chosen.20 This analysis suggests that price dispersion may decrease
with market share under competitive price discrimination.
Market density is measured by the total number of flights on the
route (FLTTO 7). Its predicted effect is positive under monopoly price dis-
crimination and negative under competitive price discrimination. We mea-
sure a carrier's market share by its share of total flights on a route (FLT-
SHARE). Under competitive price discrimination, price dispersion seems
likely to fall as FLTSHARE rises.
Product Attributes: Differences between two markets in product attributes
could induce differences in the level of price dispersion even if distributions
of consumer types across the two markets are identical. This couldoccur
when changes in some attribute of the product have a nonuniform effect on
the elasticities of different customers. In the airline industry, frequent flyer
plans (FFPs) seem to be the attribute most likely to increase the variance
in customer elasticities?' These programs offer bonuses, usually free trips,
after passengers have purchased specified amounts of air travel from the
carrier. Typically these schemes are highly nonlinear, with an increasing
marginal value of bonuses as total rni]es flown with the carrier increases.
20 Neither Borenstein, 1985, nor Holmes,1989, address multiproduct finns and
we have found no other theoretical work that sheds light on these hypotheses.
Our intuition is that the asymmetry in price discrimination is likely to occur
in a spatial model in which each brand competes more directly with some set
of 'neighbors" than with the remainder of the brands. It is less likely to occur
in a model in which each brand competes symmetrically with all other brands.
21 Given that we have eliminated first-class andconnecting service passengers
from consideration.
14FFPs tend to reduce both industry and cross-elasticities, by in-
creasing the value of the total product delivered with a ticket (raising a
customer's reservation price) and by giving a customer an incentive to con-
centrate his business with a single firm. These effects are likely to be
much stronger for business travelers than for discretionary travelers, since
infrequent travelers are much less likely to be active FFP participants.22
Since business travelers generally pay higher prices even in the absence of
FFPs, these programs probably raise the dispersion of prices charged by an
airline.23
Unfortunately, the ticket data do not record whether the purchaser
is a member of the airline's FFP, nor do we have direct data on the im-
portance of FFP participation by airline and route. We use as a proxy
for the potential significance of FFPs a measure of the airline's dominance
of traffic at the endpoint airports on a route. FFPs are likely to be most
attractive when an airline offers many flights from a customer's "home"
airport, both because this offers opportunities for laster accumulation of
mileage (and therefore more valuable bonus trips) and because it offers
broader choices of destinations for bonus travel.24 We try to capture this
effect by ENDDOMO, a measure of the carrier's share of all originating
22Giventhe nonlinear bonus schedules, customers who fly only a few tines a
year typically would take a number of years to qualify for bonus travel. This,
combined with uncertainty about changes in the tents of free travel under the
plaits and the continued existence of FFPs over time, reduces their value to
infrequent travelers.
23Thistendency probably is exacerbated by the principal/agent problem that
arises between the business traveler and his employer. Because the employee
does not fully internalize marginal payments for airline tickets, while he receives
the FFP bonuses directly, he is more likely to be willing to pay higher air fares
in exchange for the FF1' bonus.
24AsLevine (1987) and Borenstein (1989a) argue, the frequent traveler may tend
to concentrate his business with the airline that he is most likely to fly on in
the future, which will probably be one of the airlines that offers the most flights
from his home airport.
15passengers at each endpoint airport on a route, weighted by the fraction of
passengers on the route originating at that endpoint.25 As a proxy for FFP
effectiveness, we expect ENDDOMO to be positively associated with price
dispersion under either monopoly or competitive price discrimination.26
Table 2 summarizes the predicted signs of each variable discussed
above under the alternative models of monopoly andcompetitive price dis-
crimmation.
Cost —basedSources of Price Dispersion
Price dispersion may be generated by cost variationsas well as by
price discrimination. We consider two sources of cost variations acrosspas-
sengers that may generate significant variation in observed ticket prices in
our data set.27 Both are types of peak-load or congestion pricing, which we
distinguish as either "systematic" or "stochastic." Systematic peak4oad
pricing reflects variations in the expected shadow costs of capacity at the
time a flight is scheduled, while stochastic peak-loadpricing refers to de-
mand uncertainty for individual flights that is resolved only afterequipment
scheduling decisions are made. Though somewhat ad hoc, this distinction
proves useful because the data allow us to control directly for the former
effect, but not for the latter.
25Wealso have experimented with a measure of endpoint dominance based on
the carrier's share of enplanements at each endpoint airport, ENDDOME.
Differences between these two variables reflect the extent of hubbing at an
airport. Both ENDDOMO and ENDDQME yield similar results in models
that include carrier-specific fixed effects.
26Thiseffect may be somewhat offset under competitive price disrimination to
the extent that airport dominance lessens the threat of potential entry on a
route from the airport and allows a canier to behave more like a monopolist.
27Asnoted above, first-class and change-of-plane tickets are excluded, so these
sources of cost-based dispersion are not considered explicitly.
16Table 2
Predicted Coefficient SignsUnderAlternative Models
of Price Dispersion







Market Share + - 7
(FLTSHARE)
Endpoint Dominance + + 0 o
(ENDDOMO)
TOURIST - - 0 -
Variationin Flight 0 0 + 0
Capacity (SDCAPFLT)
Variation in Airport 0 0 + 0
Capacity (SDCAPAPT)
Uncongested Airport 0 0 - 0
(DUMAPT)Systematic Peak-load Pricing: Variations in capacity utilization over the
time of day or day of week may generate differences in theopportunity
cost of providing airline service, leading to prices that depend on whena
particular customer travels.28 During daily or weekly peak periods (e.g.,
weekdays, especially Fridays, from 4:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m.), most of an
airline's aircraft will be in the air, so the expected shadow cost of aircraft
capacity will be quite high. At other times, airlines may be operating 60
percent or less of their equipment, and the shadow cost of additional seats
will be near zero. Similarly, when airportrunways or air traffic control
are operating near capacity, congestion is likely to lead to slowdowns and
associated cost increases. Airlines may be unable to add additional flights,
raising the shadow cost of a seat. Peak-load pricing, reflecting variations
in these shadow costs, will result in higher prices during congested periods
and lower during off-peak periods.
This type of price variation can be systematic in the sense that it
is based on variations in shadow costs that are known at the timea flight
is opened for booking (typically 11 months prior to its departure date).
Airlines know their own utilization rates (and presumably expected airport
congestion leve]s) at the time their flight schedule for a route is set. Flight
schedules are rarely changed in response to demand patterns once a flight
is opened for booking. Flights scheduled for peak periods will be allocated
fewer discount seats, thus raising theiraverage fares. Off-peak flights will
tend to be allocated a larger number of discount seats, with loweraverage
fares.
28Holidays,e.g., Thanksgiving, and seasonal variations in demand also may gen-
erate predictable peak-load pricing patterns over the year. The period we
examine, April-June, is a "shoulder" demand period (i.e., neither the summer
peak nor the winter trough) and does not have significant holiday spikes in
traffic.
17The Department of Transportation's airline ticket database does
not provide information on the travel times or flight numbers correspond-
ing to recorded fares. While this precludes a direct estimate of time-of-
day or day-of-week congestion prernia, price dispersion due to systematic
peak-load pricing should be correlated with the variability in airlines' fleet
utilization rates and airports' operations rates. For example, if all flights
on American between two (uncongested) airports take place at off-peak pe-
riods, when less than, say, 60 percent of American's fleet is in use, there
should be almost no price variation due to peak-load pricing. On the other
hand, if one of American's flights on this route occurs at 8 a.m. on week-
days, when nearly all of the carrier's planes are in use, and its other flights
on the route are at off-peak times, then variation in the shadow price of
aircraft capacity for American's flights on this route will imply variation in
observed ticket prices. Similarly, if some of a carrier's flight on a route oc-
cur when the endpoint airports are congested and others do not, variation
in the shadow cost of runway usage should be reflected in price variation.
Information on airlines' fleet utilization rates and the endpoint airports' op-
erations rates for flights on each route may enable us to identify dispersion
due to congestion pricing.
Using this information requires us to identify the constraints at
peak periods and to decide how to quantify variations in these constraints
so as to reflect variations in costs on the route. We assume that airline fleet
capacity and airport congestion are the two most important constraints
on providing peak service.29 Congestion costs and shadow capacity costs
29Neither ofthese measures controls explicitly for a third congestion cost that
occurs when most or all of the airline's gates at an airport are in use at the
same time. Scarce gate capacity will add an additional cost, but we believe
that this cost will be highly correlated with the two measures of congestion
that we examine.
18are probably highly nonlinear functions of capacity utilization. The effect
of a marginal change in utilization is likely to be greatest at high levels
of capacity utilization and to be relatively small over a widerange of low
utilization rates. Variations in congestion costs and shadow costs of aircraft
capacity are therefore likely to be low when most flights take place on a
route during periods of low or moderate fleet or airport utilization, to rise
as more flights are scheduled during high (peak) utilization rate periods,
and to fall when most flights are scheduled during peak utilization rate
periods.30 To capture the notion that congestion and shadow costs are
convex in capacity utilization, we use higher order powers of the utilization
rate to represent the cost variables and measure variations in such costs by
the standard deviation of these variables over the periods that flights on
the route are scheduled.3'
The results reported below use the standard deviation of the cubed
airline fleet utilization rate, S.DCAPFLT, and the standard deviation of
the cubed airport operations utilization rate, SDCAPAPT, to reflect vari-
ations in peak usage. Qualitatively similar results were obtained with mea-
sures based on squared rates or higher order terms. Because traffic never
reaches capacity levels at most smaller U.S. airports, even during peak
travel periods, we construct airport capacity utilization rates only for the
22 airports that as of 1986 were designated by the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration as congested and two additional airports that have strict use
restrictions imposed by local authorities. For routes between the remain-
This last possibility -mostor all flights on a route scheduled during high
utilization rate periods -israrely observed in our data.
31Theactual construction of these variables is detailed in the data appendix.
In the analysis reported below, fleet utilization rates are measured by aircraft
utilization rates. The results are substantially the same when utilization rates
are based on seats.
19ing airports, we assume that variations in airport operations rates do not
contribute to variations in congestion or shadow costs of providing ser-
vice. We therefore set SDCAPAPT equal to zero and include a dummy
variable, DUMAPT, for these routes. To the extent that price disper-
sion is related to cost-based peak-load pricing variations, the coefficients
on SDCAPFLT and SDCAPAPT should be positive and the coefficient
on DUMAPT should be negative.
Systematic peak-load pricing also could affect coefficient estimates
for some of the variables used to distinguish between monopoly and com-
petitive price discrimination. Since this may influence the interpretation
of our results, we describe the coefficient patterns that may be suggested
by peak-load pricing and summarize these predictions in table 2, column 3.
The extent of price dispersion due to variations in the shadow cost of fixed
inputs may be affected by market structure, suggesting that effects from
peak-load pricing may influence the coefficient estimates for FLTHERF
and FLTSHARE. Unfortunately, these effects cannot be signed a priori.
Depending on the shape and location of the demand curves, the differences
between peak and off-peak prices may be larger or smaller for competitive
firms than for a monopolist.32 Of course, to the extent that that price
variation departs from shadow cost variation, we could accurately refer to
such departures as price discrimination under the definitions suggested by
Stigler (1987) and Varian (1989). We do not expect dispersion due to sys-
32Thisstatement is cIeaiy true when the peak and off-peak demand curves have
very djfferent elastithti. Simulations revealed, however, that it is also true
when the elasticities do not change as the strength of demand varies. We
assumed a demand function Q =LIP',where L is a uniformly distributed
random variable, marginal cost is constant, and per-unit capacity rental costs
are constant. The monopolist that chooses capacity optimally in such a market
and then charges the profit-maximizing price in each period (after demand is
revealed) may have a greater or lesser coefficient of variation in its prices than
would obtain when capacity and prices are set in a competitive market.
20ternatic peak-load pricing to be correlated with the number of flights ina
market, endpoint dominance, or tourism, once we control for the variation
in flight times through the capacity utilization variables.
Stochastic Peak-load Pricing: Models of peak-load pricing under demand
uncertainty suggest that optimal prices should reflect marginal operating
costs plus a charge based on both the probability that demand will ex-
ceed capacity and the expected shadow cost of capacity if it does.33 If
uncertainty about demand is resolved over time, changing the perceived
probability that demand will exceed capacity, then observed prices may
depend on when a ticket is purchased. For example, if demand is revealed
over time to be higher than expected for an Apr11 15, 4 p.m. flight, tickets
purchased close to April 15 may carry higher prices than tickets purchased
long before the departure date.34 This stochastic component may induce
price variation among the passengers on a single flight or the same flight
number on different days (with identical expected demands cx ante), as
compared to systematic effects that can induce variation in the prices paid
by passengers on different flights with differing expected demands cx ante.
Diagnosis of the effects of stochastic peak-load pricing on price dis-
persion requires at least information on the variability of demand across
individual departures on a route. Average price, demand, or load factor
by scheduled flight number, e.g., the average demand for the Friday 4 p.m.
flight on a route, is not sufficient information to determine the effects of
possible stochastic peak-load pricing. Since historical data on these aver-
See, Crew and Kicindorfer (1986).
It is the uncertainty about the probability of reaching capacity that generates
such cost-based price differences. If a flight is almost certain to be less than
full, prices should not change as the flight date approaches, even if there is
some variation in expected demand, as long as the probability of a full flight
does not change significantly.
21ages would be available to the airline at the time that flights are scheduled,
predictable variations of this sort should be addressed in aircraft schedul-
ing. The stochastic component of demand for a flight, in the sense that
we are discussing it here, is orthogonal to all information that a carrier
has at the time that it opens a flight for booking. Absent information on
each flight departure, we cannot directly control for price dispersion due to
stochastic peak-load pricing.
This raises the question of how omission of direct controls for
stochastic peak-load pricing affects the interpretation of the parameter esti-
mates that we use to detect price discrimination. First, as with systematic
peak-load pricing, the price dispersion that results from stochastic peak-
load pricing may be larger for monopolists or for competitive firms, de-
pending on the characteristics of demand, affecting coefficient estimates for
FLTHERF and FLTSHARE. Stochastic peak-load pricing is likely to
have a non-negative effect on the coefficient estimate for FLTTOT, since
the variance of passenger demand for each specific flight will tend to be
constant or increasing in number of flights.35 An effect on the TOURIST
coefficient also is possible, a positive influence if tourists as a whole gen-
erate more demand variance for specific flights and a negative influence
if tourist demand for specific flights is less variable. We do not expect
ENDDOMO to be affected by stochastic peak-load pricing, and the ca-
pacity variables, which reflect systematic peak-load variations, should be
orthogonal to stochastic variations in demand by definition. These pre-
Assuming that average load factors are not affected. For example, consider two
markets one with N passengers and F flights and a second with 2N passengers
and 2F flights. If each passenger has some probability p, p =1/FLTTOT,of
choosing Bight i, and flight choices follow a binomial distribution, then the
variance of the number of passengers choosing ñigt i, is equal to Np(1 —p).
For the smaller market, this variance is equal to N(1 —1/F)/F.For the larger
market, the variance is equal to N(1 —O.5/F)/F.
22dicted signsare summarized in column 4 of table 2.
While we cannotdirectlycontrol for stochastic peak-load pricing,
it is important to recognize that airline pricing patterns deviate from the
predictions of peak-load pricing models in a number of ways. Perhaps most
significant are the restrictions that accompany discount tickets —advance-
purchase and minimum-stay requirements rather than just time-of-use or
time-of-purchase differentials. These cannot be justified solely on the basis
on shadow capacity costs. Discounts for tickets that require Saturday night
stays but do not restrict departure or return dates cannot be explained
by either systematic or stochastic peak-load cost differences. One airline
pricing manager has described these as "the single best restriction of them
all [for] separating business from pleasure travel."36 Substantial advance
purchase discounts are too large to be explained solely by cost differences,
although two cost-based arguments frequently are offered. The first is that
bookings made far in advance allow the airline to more accurately forecast
demand and, in response, to reschedule equipment. As mentioned above,
airlines almost never alter flight schedules in response to advance bookings.
The second is that the type of people who meet these restrictions have
more firm travel plans and are therefore less likely to be "no-shows." This
certainly is true, particularly with the large cancellation penalties now at-
tached to many discount tickets, but Borenstein, 1983, demonstrates that
the difference in the no-show rates of discount versus full-fare passengers
can justify at most a 6% price differential under the most extreme assump-
tions. Under realistic assumptions, and recognizing that the practice of
overbooking allows airlines to lessen the cost of no-shows, the cost-based
36 Eucins(1986)
23price difference would probably be 2% or less.37
IV. Specification of the Empirical Model
An observation in our empirical work is the price dispersion of a
single carrier, k, among all "local" passengers that it carries between two
airports, i, j?Wemeasure price dispersion by the GINI coefficient of
faxes, as defined in section II. Because theory provides little guidance on
the functional form of the empirical model, we present results from log-
log (constant elasticity) and linear functions.39 The basic specification we
estimate is the constant elasticity log-log model:4°
Gale & Holmes, 1990,arguethat advance-purchase restrictions could be used
to efficiently allocate seats on peak-demand flights to those who value them
most, but they then conclude that such restricitions dominate explicit peak-
load pricing for a (monopoly) firm because they allow greater extraction of
consumer surplus. This result suggests to us price discrimination, not cost-
based price variation.
The term "local" here means that passengers who travel between these two
airports, but are connecting to other flights, are excluded. We treat individual
airports within a city (such as O'Hare and Midway in Chicago) as separate
markets.
"Wealso estimated the equation in log-linear form (constant proportionality).
Because the log-log results generally fit the data better than do the log-linear
results, we present results only the log-log and linear specifications. The results
are, however, qualitatively similar across all three functional forms.
40 This implicitly assumes that the error termCjjkisdistributed log-normal.
While the limited range of the GIRl could pose difficulties with this assump-
tion, there are no observations at the lower boundary of zero dispersion and
none close to (within twice the estimated standard deviation of the error term)
the theoretical upper boundary of the GIN!, 1.00
24In GINI5 =/3+ flu 1nFLTHERF5
+ thInFLTTOTj5+ /33 1nFLTSHAREIJk
+/341nENDDOMO11 +/3OnTOURISTIJk (2)
+1361nSDCAPFLTIJk+ fl.r in SDCAPAPTIJC
+ /38DUMAPT + lneijk,
where In denotes the natural log and 61jk is the error term.41 Decriptive
statistics for all variables used in the analysis are contained in table 3.
The regressions reported ate estimated by two-stage least squares,
whith addresses the likely endogeneity of several of the right-hand side
variables, as we discuss below. Carrier-specific fixed effects are included to
allow for the possibility that carrier effects are correlated with the other
right-hand side variables. If common route-specific effects induce a cor-
relation of the errors across carriers on the same route, ordinary (or
two-stage) least squares would be unbiased, but inefficient. Tests for within
route correlation of errors were highly significant, so we have estimated the
regressions by feasible generalized least squares with route-specific random
effects.42
If price discrimination enables a carrier to increase its number and
share of passengers (and therefore of flights), the variables FLTTOT and
FLTSHARE may be correlated with the error in our price dispersion equa-
tion. To treat this potential endogeneity, we instrument for FLTTOT
'In thelog-log regressions, the log of SDCAPAPT is set equal to zero for
observations in which DUMAPT is equal to one.
42Estimationwith route-speciiic fixed effects would require elimination of 185
routes on which we have only one carrier observation and would not pennit us
to estimate the effect of viab1es common to all observations on a route, i.e.,
FLTHERF and FLTTOT.
25Table 3
SummaryStatisticsfor Observations Used in Regression Analysis
Standard
Variable Deviation Minimum Maximum
CINI 0.181 0.063 0.018 0.416
FLThERF 0.437 0.190 0.163 1.000
ktnoT 0.177 0.126 0.014 0.930
FLTSHARE 0.394 0.244 0.002 1.000
ENDDOMO 0.207 0.117 0.009 0.715
TOURIST 0.013 0.013 0.003 0.070
TOURISTD 0.148 0.000 1.000
SDCAPFLT 0.197 0.063 0.000 0.358
SDCAPAPT 0.092 0.058 0.000 0.288
DUMAPT 0.089 0.000 1.000
CEOSHARE 0.269 0.171 0.011 1.000
AMEANPOF 2.891 1.574 0.376 8.921
CMEANPOP 2.292 1.378 0.197 8.909
PA11975 1336.0 1596.7 0.100 13058.0
DISTANCE 624.32 468.60 77.00 2677.00with a pre-deregulation measure of totalpassenger volume on the route
(FAX 1975), the geometric and arithmetic averages of the 1986 populations
at the two endpoints of the route (GMEANPOP and AMEANPOP), and
the distance between the two airports (DISTANCE). The instrument for
FLTSHARE is a measure of the carrier's share of enplanements at both of
the endpoint airports (GEOSHARE).43 If FLTSHARE is endogenous,
the measure of overall concentration, FLTHERF, also will be contami-
nated. We therefore include as an instrument XFLTHERF, which uses
a predicted route share rather than the actual route share of the observed
carrier in constructing the Herfindahl Index.44
V. Results of Empirical Analysis
Table 4 reports estimates for the basic model specified in equation
(1) and for a linear version of the same model. The first 2 columns report
coefficients from random-effects, 2SLS estimation; the last 2 columns report
corresponding coefficients from 2SLS estimation without correction for cor-
relation of the residuals. The general robustness of the results across these
two weighting schemes suggests that omitted variables, inclukling poten-
tial route fixed effects, do not substantially bias the results.45 For the two
linear specifications, the point estimates within about one standard error
of one another for all variables. In the log-log specification, the coeficient
See the data appendix for the construction of this instrument and see Bonn-
stein, 1989a, for a discussion of its use as an instrument for route share.
"Specificationtests for the endogeneity of FLTTOT, FLTSHARE, and
FLTHERF provided evidence of some bias if the first two were treated as ex-
ogenous. No bias was indicated in treating FLTHERF as exogenou9, but
since these tests have low power and FLTHERF is in part a function of
FLTSHARE, we present results treating all three flight variables as endo-
genous.
Ilausnian and Taylor, 1981.
26Table 4




Variable Loz-lor Linear Log-lp Linear
FLThERP -.4218 -121a -2708 -
(.079) (.028) (.067) (.033)
FLnOT -.2798 - - 246a -0668
(.058) (.039) (.057) (.025)
FLTSHARE .020 .043 -.103 .020
(.064) (.030) (.086) (.040)
ENDDOKO 076b 054b 127a 072b
(.030) (.026) (.038) (.030)
TOURIST -.0828 -
(.023) (.177) (.020) (.148)
SDCAPFLT .OS6 -.018 089b -.008
(.031) (.034) (.043) (.039)
SDCAPAPT .040c .O68c .0788 .0SOc
(.024) (.040) (.027) (.044)
DUMAPT -3538 -.022I -470a -
(.086) (.008) (.089) (.008)
All regressions include carrier specific fixed effects.
Aysuiptotic standard errors reported in parentheses.
a —significantat 1% level
b —significantat 5% level
c —significantat 10% levelestimates are slightly less stable, but are within two times the standard
errors of one another for all variables except FLTHEF?F. The qualitative
results generally are insensitive to other changes in the specification of the
model, although the precision of the parameter estimates varies. We focus
our discussion on the results from the constant-elasticity, random-effects
specification.
The strongest result is the significant negative effect of increases
in route concentration on price dispersion. In the log-log model, holding
constant the carrier's route share, an increase of one standard deviation
in FLTHERF from its mean reduces GINI by about 18%. This result
is consistent with the predictions of competitive price discrimination mod-
els, suggesting that price dispersion due to discriminatory pricing may in-
crease as airline markets become more competitive. While the negative
FLTHERF coefficient estimates reject the model of monopoly price dis-
crimination as the sole or dominant source of airline price dispersion, the
estimates could reflect peak-load pricing, as explained earlier.
Further support for the competitive price discrimination interpre-
tation of the FLTHERF coefficient is provided by the coefficient on the
route density variable, FLTTOT. Higher route density appears to lower
a carrier's price dispersion, holding constant market concentration and the
carrier's route share. In the log-log model, increasing FLTTOT by one
standard deviation from its mean reduces the Gini coefficient by 20%.This
is consistent with price discrimination that is based on differences in cus-
tomers' willingness to switch firms, which become less important as the
number of flights increases and the differencesamong firms decrease (as
measured by differences in departure times).46 The sign of this coefficient
46Competitiveprice discimination implies that the effect of density should depend
27is inconsistent with the predictions generated by models of monopoly price
discrimination, systematic peak-load pricing, and stochastic peak-load pric-
ing, as noted in table This does not imply that price dispersion is due
solely to competitive price discrimination, rather that observed patterns of
dispersion across markets and carriers appear at least in part attributable
to competitive price discrimination.
The estimated effects of a carrier's relative market position on price
dispersion are mixed. The estimated impact of larger route shares, mea-
sured by FLTSHARE is positive in both specifications when estimated
with random effects, but is not statistically significant and it is negative in
the log-log model when the GLS correction is not carried out, Airport dom-
inance, measured by ENDDOMO, tends to raise dispersion. In. the log-log
specification, a one-standard deviation increase in ENDDOMO from its
mean raises dispersion by 4%. Though our analysis does not enable us to
diagnose the mechanism through which endpoint dominance induces higher
price dispersion, the results are consistent with a greater effectiveness of fre-
quent flyer programs in raising high-end or business class fares at airports
that the carrier dominates.
Higher concentrations of tourist traffic are consistently associated
with lower levels of price dispersion, as expected. When the value of
TOURIST is one standard deviation above its mean value, the Gini co-
efficient is 8% smaller than it is at the mean of TOURIST. This effect
on market concentration levels. While the coefficient on FLTTOT is more
negative when FLTHERF is low, consistent with this implication, the data
do not allow us to statistically distinguish between FLTTOT coefficients in
low and high concentration markets.
"Thereis a possible caveat to this conclusion. If higher FLTTOT lowers the
stochastic component of demand for a flight at peak demand time, which would
probably lower the expected shadow value of capacity at peak demand time,
then this result could be consistent with stochastic peak-load pricing.
28may reflect variation in both industry and cross-elasticities, since tourist
travelers are likely to have higher absolute values of both. We expected
this attribute of the consumer population to act nonlinearly on price dis-
persion, causing less dispersion when it is at either its high or its low end.
In exploratory analysis, however, TOURIST appeared to capture only the
decrease in dispersion on routes with the highest tourist values, primarily
those routes including cities in Hawaii, Florida, and Nevada. This may
result from the rather crude nature of our tourism proxy: the variable does
best at distinguishing high tourism markets and is less effective at distin-
guishing primarily business markets from more balanced markets.48
The results for our controls for airline and airport capacity uti-
lization measures are roughly as expected. SDCAPFLT, which measures
variation in airline fleet utilization rates, is statistically insignificant in the
linear model, but is significant at the 10% level in the log-log model, where
a one-standard deviation increase in SDCAPFLT from its mean raises
dispersion by 2%. Increased variation in airport operations rates, reflected
in SDCAPAPT and DUMAPT, is consistently associated with increased
price dispersion, as would be expected if airlines engage in peak-load or
congestion pricing over time-of-day and time-of-week. In the log-log speci-
fication, a one standard deviation increase in SDCAPAPT from its mean
raises the Gini coefficient by 3%. Routes on which neither endpoint airport
is congested (DUMAPT equal to 1) average 26% less price dispersion than
do routes on which at least one endpoint airport is congested, other things
48Wealso havereplaced.TOURIST with a dummy variable (TOURISTD) for
high tourism routes. In these models, the estimated Gini coefficient for high
tourism routes is roughly 25% below that for all other routes. The data do
not distinguish further differences in price dispersion among the high tourism
markets.
29equal.49
The results of this statistical analysis suggest the existence of price
discrimination based on heterogeneity in cross-elasticities of demand, as well
as dispersion due to peak-load pricing. This does not imply that either dis-
crirnination based on industry elasticities or dispersion attributable to other
cost variations is absent. The regressions have significant nonzero constant
terms and predict price dispersion even on monopoly routes. Moreover,
since the regressions account for less than 20% of the variation, there is
considerable price dispersion that may be explained by factors related to
sorting on industry elasticities or by factors related to unobserved variations
in the cost of service.
The results also suggest that price dispersion may be affected by
differences in carriers' abilities to execute sophisticated pricing policies. The
data reveal substantial differences in the average level of price dispersion
across carriers, even after controlling for the specified population, product,
and market characteristics. Table 5 reports the estimated carrier fixed
effects from the constant elasticity Gini regressions estimated with random
effects. These coefficients measure each carrier's average price dispersion
relative to American Airlines' average dispersion. Notably, airlines that
operated a computer reservation system (CBS) in 1986 —American,Delta,
Eastern, TWA, and United —generallyexhibit a greater degree of price
dispersion than carriers that did not operate CRSs. In fact, the difference
between the average fixed effect for carriers that operate CUSs and the
average for those that do not is statistically quite significant. The result is
This figure comes from calculating the effect of in S.DCAPAPT on price dis-
persion at its average non-zero value and comparing it to the estimated de-
crease in dispersion when DUMAPT is equal to one (and, by construction,
1nSDCAPAPT is set equal to zero).
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Owners of Computer Reservation Systems:





TRANS WORLD .243. .042.
(.050) (.008)
UNITED -- l28a -.023.
(.037) (.006)
Non-Owners of Computer Reservation Systems:
(relative to American Airlines)








REPUBLIC -. llBb -.026.
(.048) (.008)
WESTERN .154b -. 030.
(.069) (.010)
Fixed effect for American Airlines omitted from estimation.
Asymptotic standard errors reported in parentheses.
a —significantat 1% level
b —significantat 5% level
c —significantat 10% levelconsistent with the claim that a CRSassistsin utilization of sophisticated
"yield management" techniques, i.e., methods for allocating discount seats
in a way that maximizes revenue on each flight.
VI. Conclusion
This study documents the existence of significant dispersion in the
prices charged by a given airline in a given airline market. It provides clear
evidence that the level of a carrier's price dispersion within a market is
related to the structure of the market. As the number of competitors in
a market grows, holding constant the total number of flights, price dis-
persion increases. This and other empirical results of the analysis imply
that traditional monopoly theories of price discrimination may give nei-
ther complete explanations nor accurate predictions of pricing patterns in
rnonopolistically competitive markets.
In addition to providing a description of pricing behavior in the
airline industry, this study points out a need for additional theoretical
work on price discrimination. Price discrimination in markets with many
multi-product firms seems to respond to additional factors and to behave
in substantially different ways than does price discrimination in markets
characterized either by multi-product monopoly or by many single-product
monopolistically competitive firms. The theoretical literature has been rel-
atively quiet on this subject, though some of the extensions from literature
on monopolistically competitive price discrimination may be straightfor-
ward.50 A careful, thorough model of such a market, possibly along the
line of Holmes' (1989) duopoly model, may provide a useful guide for fu-
50Theliterature on price disaimination with search costs or imperfect infonna-
tion may also shed light on the topic. See, for instance, Salop, 1977, and Salop
& Stiglitz, 1977.
31ture empirical work.
Our exploration of airline price dispersion is not exhaustive and
some of the cost-based explanations for price dispersion are not fully test-
able with these data. The basic relationships appear to be quite robust,
however, and seem unlikely to be explained solely on cost bases. Our find-
ings invite further research to determine whether the relationships we find
between price dispersion and market structure variables extend to other
industries.
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34Appendix: Data Description and Construction of Variables
Each observation in the sample is a unique carrier-route pair. A
route is a pair of airports between which passengers in this sample travel
without changing planes. A round-trip ticket is considered to be two direc-
tional trips on the route and the fare paid on each directional trip is taken
to be half of the round-trip fare. A one-way ticket is one directional trip
on the route.
PRICE DATA:
The source of the ticket and price data is Databank 1A (DB1A)
of the Department of Transportation's Origin and Destination Survey for
the second quarter of 1986. The DB1A is a random 10% sample of all
tickets that originate in the U.S. on U.S. air carriers. We use a version
of the database that has been processed by Boeing Computer Services.
The Boeing processing eliminates all tickets that are not either one-way or
round-trip travel, such as open-jaw (e.g., LAX-BOS-SEA) and circle trips
(LAX-MIA-BOS-LAX). It also removes tickets that involve more than one
change of plane on any directional trip.
After intensive examination of the DE1A data and discussions with
Boeing and Department of Transportation officials, a number of further
adjustments to the database were made:
1. Exclusion of tickets that:
a. Included one or more segments of first-class travel.
b. Included travel on more than one airline on a directional trip (known
as interline tickets).
c. Included an origin or destination at an airport outside the U.S. or
at an airport that is not one of the 200 largest U.S. airports. This
latter criterion is not unduly restrictive, as the 200th largest U.S.
airport is in Deadhorse, Alaska, where an average of 138 passengers
were enplaned each day.
2. Exclusion of tickets that indicated probable faze keypunch error or fre-
quent flyer bonus trips. These were selected as follows:
a. All tickets with fares of $10.00 or less. These are presumed to be
frequent flyer bonus trips, which are not reported in any consistent
way by different carriers.
b. Tickets with fares in excess of specified multiples of the calculated
Standard Industry Fare Level (SIFL) for the route. This criteria is
siimlar to one used by Boeing Computer Services in their internal
processing of the DB1A. The SIFL for a route is based on a non-
linear function of distance similar to the formula that was used by
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DISTANCE in miles (described below) between the two endpoint
airports and applied a formula used by Boeing Computer Services
to calculate 1986, 2nd quarter fares. The formula is:
SIFL =26.02+ .1423 *(MILES0 —500)+ .1085 *(MILES501 —1500)
+ .1043 *(MILES1501 —END)
For routes of 500 miles or less, we excluded tickets reporting fares of
4.0 or more times the SIFL. For routes above 500 miles, we excluded
tickets reporting fares of 3.5 or more times the SIFL.
3. Exclusion of all Alaskan Airlines tickets. This decision was dictated by
the unreliability of data reported by this airline, including an exceptionally
high frequency of fare error8 (e.g. very high percentages of one-way coach
fares in excess of $5,000).
4. Exclusion of all routes served by United Airlines that included La-
Guardia or JFK International Airports as an endpoint. This was required
by United's tendency to combine most tickets with a LGA or JFK endpoint
under a single generic New York City Airport #7 code.
5. Assignment of New York Air's tickets with a reported endpoint of Wash-
ington, D.C. Airport #3 (which does not exist) to Dulles International
Airport (Washington, D.C. airport #1), based on advice from officials at
Boeing Computer Services.
From the DB1A, we calculated the total reported passengers for all
carriers on each route and selected the 1200 largest routes (there were 1201
routes due to a tie for position 1200). The analysis in this study is conducted
for the routes in this set for which 80 percent or more of the passengers
travelled direct (i.e., without a change of plane on the directional trip).
To maximize comparability of service quality across passengers, tickets in-
dicating a change of plane were excluded from the analysis. The DB1A
does not permit us to distinguish nonstop service from direct service that
includes on-flight stops.
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GINI: Geometrically, the Gini coefficient is defined as twice the area
betweenthe 45 degreeline in a plot of percent-of-passengers
on percent-of-revenue and the Lorenz curve, which is the line
that plots the percent of revenue contributed by the bottom
x% of passengers (0 ￿ x < 1). We computed GINI by the
formula:
GINI =1—2* (E Fare1* PAX1/Total Revenues)
i=1,N
* (PAX1/Total FAX + (1— LPAX1/TotalFAX))
j=t,i
where N is the number of different fare level tickets reported
by a carrier on a route, Fare1 is the reported fare for the
ith ticket, and PAX1 is the reported number of passengers
travelling at that fare.
CV: The coefficient of variation, CV, is defined as the passenger-
weighted standard deviation of fares divided by the passenger-
weighted mean fare for a carrier on a route.
CFLTTOT: The observed carrier's total number of direct flights on a route
per week in either direction. If there is at least one nonstop
flight on the route, then all nonstop and onestop flights are
included. If there is no nonstop flight on the route, then all
onestop and twostop flights are included. Source: Official
Airline Guide, May 15, 1986.
FLTTOT: The total number of direct flights on a route per week in
either direction, calculated as the sum of CFLTTOT for all
scheduled jet airlines serving the route.
FLTSHARE: The proportion of flights on a route accounted for by the ob-
served carrier, defined as CFLTTOT divided by FLTTOT.
FLTHERF: The Herfindahl index of concentration on the observed route,
using FLTSHARE as the measure of market share for each
carrier.
ENDDOMQ: A measure of endpoint dominance based on origination.
ENDDOMO is defined as the weighted average across the
endpoints of the route of the observed airline's share of pas-
senger origination at each endpoint. An origination is the
beginning of a directional trip (it differs from enplanements
in that enplanements include passengers changing planes for
37continuations of directional trips). The weight for each end-
point is DIRECTIk —seethe discussion at APAX for its
definition.
SDCAPFLT: The standard deviation of cubed fleet utilitization rates for
the observed carrier on the observed route. For each sched-
uled flight on a route (where flights are defined by time of day
and day of week), we compute the average number of aircraft
the carrier has in flight system-wide during the time the flight
on the observed route is scheduled (defined as from 10 minutes
before scheduled takeoff to 10 minutes after after scheduled
landing). This yields a measure of capacity utilization during
that flight. We divide this by the maximum number of aircraft
the carrier has in flight at any point during its weekly sched-
ule to obtain a capacity utilization rate for that flight. We
cube the capacity utilization rate for each flight, then com-
pute the standard deviation of this variable across all flights
for the carrier on the route to obtain SDCAPFLT. We also
have experimented with SDCAPF2 (based on the square of
the capacity utilization rate) and SDCAPF4 (based on the
fourth power of the capacity utilization rate). Flight infor-
mation is based on the Official Airline Guide, May 15, 1986.
SDGAPAPT: The standard deviation of cubed airport capacity utilization
rates for the observed carrier on the observed route, if one
or both endpoint airports are on the FAA's list of the 22
most congested airports (or is Long Beach or Orange County
Airport, the two that have very restrictive local regulation).
Otherwise, SDCAPAPT is set equal to zero. This variable is
analogous to SDCAPFLT, except that capacity utilization
rates are constructed from airport activity measures. Flight
information is based on the Official Airline Guide, May 15,
1986.
TOURIND: A tourism index for a metropolitan area, defined as Hotel
Income from Group/Tourist customers divided by Total Per-
sonal Income. Source: Census of Service Industries, 1977, for
proportion of hotel revenues from Group/Tourist customers;
Census of Service Industries, 1982, for metropolitan area ho-
tel revenues; State and Metropolitan Area Data Book, 1985,
for total personal income.
TOURIST: The weighted average of a truncated TOURIND for the two
endpoints of the observed route. TOURIND is truncated at
.07 for all endpoints (this downweights the index primarily for
Reno and Las Vegas, where hotel revenue includes gambling
income). The weight for an endpoint is the proportion of
the observed carrier's passengers on the route who originated
their travel at the other endpoint. For route ij, the weight for
endpoint i is (1 —DIRECTIJk);for endpoint jtheweight is
38DIRECTjk —seethe discussion at APAX for its definition.
TOURISTD: A dummy variable equal to one for observations witha value
of TOURIST in excess of .02, 0 otherwise. Approximately
15 percent of the observations have values of TOURIST in
excess of .02. We also experimented with sets of dummy vari-
ables that broke a weighted average TOURIND into three
categories: .02 to .0499, .05 to .0799, and .08 and above. The
data generally did not reject equality of coefficientsacross
these categories.
DISTANCE: The Great Circle route nonstop mileage between the two end-
point airports on a route, calculated from airport latitude
and longitude coordinates. This calculation ignores change
of plane and on-flight stops. The coordinates are from the
Department of Transportation's Databank 5.
AMEANPOP: The arithmetic mean of the populations of the endpoint SM-
SAs of the route. For SMSAs with more than one airport
in the top 200, the population is apportioned to each airport
according to each, airport's share of total enplanements in the
SMSA. Source: 1987 Statistical Abstract of the U.S.
GMEANPOP: The geometric mean of the populations of the endpoint cities




where y indexes all airlines, x is the observed airline, and
ENP1 and ENP2 are airline y's average daily enplanements
at the two endpoint airports during the second quarter of
1986.
FAX 1975: The total passengers reported on the route during theyear
ending September 30, 1975. Source: U. S. Civil Aeronautics
Board, Origin and Destination, Table 11.
XFLTHERF: Created under the assumption that the concentration of the
flights on a route that are not performed by the observed air-
line is exogenous with respect to the price of the observed
carrier, e.g., that TWA's price on the JFK-Los Angeles route
does not affect the division of non-TWA flights between
American and United. XFLTHERF is thesquare of the
fitted value for FLTSHARE (from its first-stage regression)
plus the "rescaled" sum of the squares of all other carrier's
shares. The rescaling maintainsamong all carriers other than
the one observed the concentration of flights not performed
by the observed carrier. To be concrete:
392 XFLTHERFFLTSHARE
FLTHERF -FLTSHARE2 + '1 FLTSHARE'2
(1 —FLTSHARE)2 /
APAX:The adjusted total passengers for a carrier on a route. While
the DB1A is supposed to reflect a random 10 percent sam-
pie of all tickets, in reality airline reporting rates often differ
significantly from this. We therefore adjust the passenger
counts reported in the DB1A for deviations from the 10 per-
cent reporting rate. For each carrier, k, at each of the top
200 airports, i, we calculate the reporting rate, REPORTk,
as 10*(carrier k DMA reported passenger enplanements at
1) divided by (carrier k census passenger enpianements at i).
Census passenger enplanements are from the D.O.T.'s Non-
stop Market Data, which is a census of available seats, pas-
sengers enplaned, and passengers transported on every flight
segment of every U.S. airline. For a carrier that reports a
10 percent sample of tickets at an airport, REPORT will
equal 1.0. For each carrier and each route in the data set, we
compute an adjustment factor, ADJUSTIk, defined as:
ADJUST1JJ =DIRECTqk*REPORTIk -DIRECT1,k)*REPORTik
where DIRECTIJk is the percent of carrier k's passengers
travelling on theroutebetween airports i and jwhoorigi-
nated their travel at airport i (i.e., i is the origination point
of their ticket). We then compute APAXIJk as:
APAXIJk =(DB1Areported passengers on route
ii /orcarrier k)/ADJUSTIjk.
Missing or incomplete data were treated as follows: For car-
riers missing from the census file at an airport (apparently
due to inconsistent recording of carrier codes) we assumed
a reporting rate of 1.0. For carriers missing directional in-
formation (due to very small numbers of passengers or no
recorded round trips), we used the aggregate (for all carriers)
DIRECT1, defined as the percent of all passengers travelling
on the route who originated their travel at airport i.
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